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This paper draws attention to the potential pitfalls and possibilities of a new cosmopolitanism. The first 
part of the paper briefly portrays cosmopolitanism as a name and metaphor for a way of life, an ideal and 
an outlook. The second part, however, discloses a paradoxical attribution of the metaphor, revealing the 
ways in which it assumes something which it is not. The third part of the paper further explores the powers 
of this paradox, arguing that the new cosmopolitanism can be seen as a riddle that surprises, bewilders and 
educates: The surprise is in the deviation from current and most common ways of speech. The bewilderment 
happens as the mantra of cosmopolitanism is bringing together logical opposites, jumbling categories and 
disturbing pre-existing modes of thought. The educational work of cosmopolitanism thus occurs as a 
violation of the cognitive framework and logical categories generating our very modes of learning. The vital 
work of the new cosmopolitanism is therefore in the ways in which it creates epistemic ruptures, recasts our 
mental categories, generates radically new modes of learning, and thus completely new ways of experiencing, 
seeing and knowing a world of change. But what are the potential pitfalls and possibilities of a discourse 
jeopardizing the very vision of the social world, and thus the world itself? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper draws attention to the potential pitfalls and possibilities of a new cosmopolitanism. As the 
world is becoming a smaller place, with intensified contacts within, across and beyond national, social, 
political, cultural and religious borders, new ways of knowing and seeing a world of change emerge. 
Several authors thus speak of a “cosmopolitan turn” within and beyond the sciences, including within 
the discipline of education (Beck, 2006, Beck & Sznaider, 2006, Delanty, 2006, Pieterse, 2006). 
According to Fine (2003, 2007) this turn can be identified, first, by a shared aspiration to overcome 
national presuppositions and prejudices; secondly, by the widespread acknowledgment of the vision 
that humanity has entered an era of mutual interdependence on a global scale; and thirdly, by the rising 
numbers of normative and prescriptive theories of global citizenship and cosmopolitan democracy. The 
new “cosmopolitanism” thus carries a tension as it, on the one hand, denotes a way of the world, a 
condition, an evolving and extremely complex social reality, and, on the other hand, denotes a way of 
seeing the world, a form of consciousness, an emerging paradigm of social and political analysis.  
“Cosmopolitanism” derives from Greek kosmo politês (‘citizen of the world’). Diogenes the 
Cynic (412 – 323 BC) is said to be the very first philosopher using the term. When asked where he 
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came from, he replied: “I am a citizen of the world”—which was a radical claim in a world where a 
man’s identity was strongly connected to him as a member of a particular city state. Living in exile, as 
an outcast, and as a man without identity, Diogenes thus made a mark on his contemporaries. Kant 
(1724 – 1804) later pictured cosmopolitan rights as the “right of hospitality” belonging to strangers in a 
foreign land (Kant 1795/2009). Derrida (1930 – 2007) followed this vision when he addressed the 
question of the cosmopolitan rights of asylum seekers, refugees, and immigrants in a speech to the 
international parliament of writers in Strasbourg in 1996. There, he revisited the issue of ‘open cities’ 
(ville frances) or ‘refugee cities’ (ville refugees) where migrants may seek sanctuary from the pressures of 
persecution, intimidation and exile (Derrida 2001). Today, however, cosmopolitanism evokes an image 
of coming generations holding global citizenships and forms of symbolic capital—a cosmopolitan 
ethos—that makes them strangers nowhere in the world (Nussbaum, 1997). As an educational ideal, 
cosmopolitanism thus expresses the idea that all human beings—regardless of national, religious, 
cultural, or political affiliations—should be seen as members of the same community, and that this 
community should be cultivated. The current mantra of cosmopolitanism thus seems to be carrying 
images and visions that not only serve to name the world, but also to recast the very visions of the 
world and our place in it. But what is in this particular name? And what happens in the act of naming? 
In this paper I explore the work of the name cosmopolitanism. I start by briefly portraying the new 
cosmopolitanism as a way of life, an ideal and an outlook. In the second part, however, I disclose the 
ways in which the name and metaphor carry paradoxical attributions. In the third part I explore the 
powers of this paradox: In what ways may the inherent contradictions of the new cosmopolitanism 
affect its making? And what may be the potential pitfalls and possibilities of a discourse that jeopardizes 
the very vision of the social world? 
 
 
Cosmopolitanism as a Way of Life, an Ideal and an Outlook 
 
Contemporary philosophers of education use cosmopolitanism as a metaphor for a way of life made 
possible by the kinds of tolerance, flexibility, and openness towards otherness that is characterized by 
an ethics of social relations in an interconnected world of change (e.g., Appiah, 2008, Kemp, 2005, 
Nussbaum, 1997, Papastephanou, 2005). But what does this way of life look like? An extensive study 
(Molz, 2006) of contemporary round-the-world travelers, from ages seven to sixty, found that this 
group of travelers “literally embodies cosmopolitanism” (p. 17). The cosmopolitan characteristics of 
flexibility, adaptability and openness to difference and risk are to them embodied performances of 
fitness and fitting in. They are “fit to travel” by their privileged position, vaccinated and well-trained 
bodies, and global appearance. Accordingly, they do whatever to “fit in” by adapting their bodies to 
changing environments, hiding their stigma of provinciality, and reaching for an identity as global 
nomads. The round-the-world-travelers desire to “be like chameleons”, not necessarily by adapting and 
blending in with the locals, but rather blending in with a given image of a “traveler”. In this way, the 
round-the-world-traveler manifests an image of a cosmopolitan lifestyle generated by a cultural climate 
of mobility, urban sophistication, privileged detachment, and transnational relations. This image of 
cosmopolitanism as a form of cultural capital is confirmed by a recent survey of 535 Dutch parents 
whose children attend international schools (Weenink, 2008). The majority of these parents—“the 
pragmatic cosmopolitans”—saw the advantage of an international orientation (for example, to learn 
advanced English). But they did not relate to a vision of the world as open, to be explored by everyone, 
or to a dedication of cultural openness, despite admitting the benefit of such an attitude for the future 
of their children. They expressed an image of cosmopolitanism as a range of competencies—skills and 
attitudes—that provide competitive advantage in the future careers of their children. However, a large 
minority of the parents—“the dedicated cosmopolitans”—advocated flexibility, open-mindedness, and 
the willingness and ability to look beyond borders. But their multicultural ideology seemed class biased 
as they expressed a larger interest in western or westernized foreigners, and a tendency to avoid other 
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groups of foreigners. The idea of cosmopolitanism thus seems to be one of advocating a rather 
superior way of life as well as an ethos nurtured among those privileged that have access to such a life-
style. 
As an educational ideal, however, the term “cosmopolitanism” expresses the idea that all human 
beings—regardless of national, religious, cultural, or political affiliation—should be seen as members of 
the same community, and that this idea should be cultivated. But a vital dilemma is the tension between 
an abstract universalism from above versus a concrete moral commitment from below. Ossewaarde 
(2007) argues that the ideal of cosmopolitanism is nothing more than a manifestation of the mindset of 
a global elite who have “more in common with partners in Manhattan, London, Singapore or Hong 
Kong than with locals or nationals that are not plugged into a network of global connectedness” (p. 
373). The ethos of the new cosmopolitan, he holds, is about flexibility, objectivity, detachment and the 
ability to create a distance to cultural patterns and existing loyalties. Cosmopolitans render cultural 
differences superfluous as they “become friends of humanity”. The new cosmopolitanism from above 
thus recognizes humanity before sociality. This outlook is confirmed by Nussbaum (1997) who opts for 
a stoic cosmopolitanism that transcends local loyalties and traditions. She holds that cosmopolitanism is 
“an invitation to exile” (p. 7). By contrast, Appiah (2007) argues for a cosmopolitanism flowing from, 
rather than transcending, rooted ways of life. However, the tension between a somewhat abstract 
cosmopolitanism from above and a rooted cosmopolitanism from below remains one of the major 
problems of contemporary cosmopolitanism. Benhabib (2006) addressed the issue in her 2004 Berkeley 
Tanner lectures. Taking the dilemma between a somewhat abstract and enlightened morality on the one 
hand and the complex aspirations of the hybrid identities of citizens not belonging to any primordial 
community or nation on the other hand, she argued that the task of a normative cosmopolitanism 
should be to “mediate moral universalism with ethical particularism” (p. 19). But this dilemma remains 
unresolved. 
Moreover, a vital issue is whether a Western notion of cosmopolitanism overshadows non-
Western visions. Paralleling European cosmopolitanism with the modernist philosophers’ quest for 
certainty, Toulmin (1990) exposes the hidden, but yet persistent agenda of a cosmopolitanism of the 
West: A vision of society as rationally ordered as the Newtonian view of nature. Toulmin thus claims 
that the pursuit for abstract neatness and theoretical simplicity has “blinded the successors of Descartes 
to the unavoidable complexities of concrete human experience” (p. 201). Toulmin’s analysis also reveals 
how Western cosmopolitanism carries a whole cosmogony; a deep-seated image of creation; a theory of 
how a perfect society can come into existence. A cosmogony of the West is hallmarked by having chaos 
(not nothingness) as its starting point and the rational word (not play, breath, or spirit) as its creative 
principle. Consequently, Western cosmopolitanism seems to oppose the lively and creative hubbub of a 
globalised world since it carries connotations of a perfect well-ordered society born out of chaos by the 
use of words. The contrasts between divergent cosmopolitan visions thus come forward as an 
impossible dilemma, since a biased cosmopolitanism of the West may well disturb and continue to 
marginalize non-Western representations, visions and experiences. Westernized images of a 
harmonious, well-ordered, orderly, and rational global society also contrast with the worldly, lively and 
creative cities of today, whether in the west or ‘the rest’. Apparently, there are pitfalls that come with 
blindly adopting a vision of cosmopolitanism deeply embedded in a long-lasting European 
philosophical discourse and to force it into a vision of a new world order. Nevertheless, several authors 
point to an evolving “cosmopolitan outlook” within and beyond the sciences. 
The cosmopolitan outlook signifies a new way of seeing the world and a new and emerging paradigm 
of social and political analysis. With a cosmopolitan outlook earlier worldviews and ways of 
categorizing, such as “the old differentiations between internal and external, national and international, 
us and them” (Beck, 2006, p. 14) lose their validity. Following Beck and Sznaider (2006) the current 
cosmopolitanism signifies an emerging global awareness, altered images and new habits of thought, and 
may thus be characterized as a “globalization from within”. Beck and Sznaider do not undermine the 
fact that “people, from Moscow to Paris, from Rio to Tokyo, have long since been living in really-existing 
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relations of interdependence” (p. 9). But, “what’s new is not forced mixing but global awareness of it, its self-
conscious political affirmation, its reflection and recognition before a global public via mass media, in 
the news and in the global social movements of blacks, women and minorities, and in the current vogue 
for such venerable concepts as ‘Diaspora’ in the cultural sciences” (p. 10). In other words, shared 
images, worldviews and habits of thought and action are, on the one hand, becoming more and more 
cosmopolitan. On the other hand, there is a growing worldwide awareness of these new images, 
worldviews and habits of thought and action. Fine (2007) sees this new outlook as the new 
cosmopolitanism’s reflexive—or interpretative—moment. Beck (2006) further indicates how this new 
outlook concurrently serves as a diagnosis of the current age and a normative stance supporting, for 
example, moral judgment and political action. But as a cosmopolitan outlook is unavoidably generated 
by social conditions, it may serve to justify, uphold and reproduce the ways of the world that is 
diagnosed, understood and recognized by this outlook. It is therefore vital to further explore in what 
respects the cosmopolitan turn possibly can imply genuinely new ways of naming and reading the 
world. 
 
 
Naming the World 
 
Despite being an ambiguous and contested term, “cosmopolitanism” has been adopted as a symbolic 
representation of the contemporary ways of the world. But what is in this particular name? And what 
happens in the act of naming?  
The term “cosmopolitanism” is composed of ‘cosmos’ and ‘polis’: ‘Cosmos’ derives from the 
Greek ‘kósmos’, which literally means “order”. ‘Cosmos’ is the antithesis of ‘chaos’ and carries the 
connotation of a universe regarded as a well-ordered whole. To Eliade (1952) cosmos is the ideal 
archetype of an orderly system, embracing “all that is perfect, complete, harmonious or fruitful ... 
Cosmos is the pattern created by the gods, their masterpiece” (p. 64).  ‘Polis’ literally means “city” or 
“city-state” and carries the connotation of a body of citizens. ‘Citizens’ are distinct from ‘nomads’, in 
that they signify stability rather than movements or relocation; ‘Citizens’ are also distinct from 
‘barbarians’ in that they are educated; ‘Citizens’ are natives of a civilized community or city. The term 
“cosmopolitanism” thus carries an essential contrast, as ‘cosmos’ is here juxtaposed to ‘polis’; an 
orderly whole juxtaposed to a lively particular; an unlimited order to a limited space; an all-
encompassing universality to a definite body of fellow citizens; a divine design to a really existing reality. 
This binary feature of cosmopolitanism draws attention to the logical order of “cosmo-polis”, which is 
paralleling the harmonious patterns of ‘cosmos’ with the social dynamics of ‘polis’.  “Cosmopolitanism” 
thus literally denotes the idea of a well-ordered civilization. But the term should not be read literally. 
On the contrary, “cosmopolitanism” is a name and metaphor, also used in a figurative sense. 
“Metaphor”, according to Aristotle, “consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from 
species to species, or on grounds of analogy” (Poetics 1457b 6-9). To name the present ways of the 
world “cosmopolitanism” is thus implicitly to compare and contrast the contemporary reality with an 
image of something that it is not. The reason is that a metaphor is a relation between two references—
the one being the images of the world provided by the metaphor’s name, the other the contemporary 
ways of the world that are being designated. It is exactly this dual reference that distinguishes the 
metaphorical statement from the literal one. In the case of “cosmopolitanism”, the metaphor is the relation 
between an image of a perfect design and the dynamic social and political order of today. Or to be 
more exact, the metaphor is the proposed relation between an image of a perfect well-ordered civilization 
and the contemporary ways of the world. The work of the metaphor happens through this relation, 
as—according to Aristotle—the relationship is about “giving the thing a name that belongs to something 
else”, and thereby transferring meaning “from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species 
to species, or on grounds of analogy” (1457b 6-9, my emphasis). Adopting the name 
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“cosmopolitanism” is thus adopting a relationship that parallels, compares and contrasts the 
contemporary ways of the world to an image of something which it is not—namely, an orderly, 
ordered, stable, and harmonious whole. 
In this way, the metaphor of cosmopolitanism concurrently emphasizes difference and 
resemblance, in saying that the perfect blueprint of a harmonious city-state differs from the 
contemporary ways of the world while simultaneously pointing to the similarities between the two. 
Such dissimilar similarities lie at the heart of metaphors, as “... a good metaphor implies an intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars” (Poetics 1459 a 3-8). The quality and vigor of a metaphor 
thus depends on the ability to perceive the similarities of very different things. Aristotle offers some 
examples:  
 
As in philosophy, too, it is characteristic of a well-directed mind to observe the likeness even in 
things very different. Thus, Archytas [the Phytagorean philosopher] said that an arbiter and an 
altar were the same thing; for one who has committed a wrong flies to both. Or [another 
example is] if someone said that an anchor and a rope hung from a hook are the same thing, for 
both are the same, but they differ in that one is hung from above and one from below. And to 
say that [the allotment of land in] cities “have been equalized” is the same thing in widely 
different cases: the equality is in the surface of land and the powers [assigned to each citizen]. 
(Rhetoric 1412a 14 – 23)  
 
These examples illustrate that the work of a metaphor depends on the ability to observe the likeness in 
very different cases. Or—as Ricoeur puts it—“the dynamic of metaphor would rest ... on the 
perception of resemblance”. (Ricoeur 1977, p. 24)  
The name and metaphor of “cosmopolitanism” thus carries some ambiguities: First, the name 
itself carries an essential ambiguity, as ‘cosmos’ is here juxtaposed to ‘polis’; an orderly whole to a lively 
particular; an all-encompassing universality to a definite body of fellow citizens; a harmonious design to 
a dynamic social reality. Second, the name and metaphor compares and contrasts the contemporary 
ways of the world to this impossible image, while concurrently saying that “this is that” and “this is not 
that”. Some contradictions thus emerge: Initially in the name, which actually contradicts itself in 
simultaneously saying that “polis is like cosmos” and “polis is not like cosmos.” Next in the way the 
metaphor compares, contrasts, and parallels the contemporary ways of the world to this ambiguous and 
conflicting image, and thereby providing a contradictory outlook of the contemporary ways of the 
world as concurrently “cosmopolitan” and “not cosmopolitan”. The mystery of “cosmopolitanism” is 
therefore that it compares reality with an impossible image, while concurrently asserting it to be 
something which it is not, namely this impossible image (Black 1962; 1979, Derrida 1982, Laclau 1998, 
Ricoeur 1977). “Cosmopolitanism” thus appears as a paradox. 
A paradox occurs as a self-contradiction. Or to be more accurate, a paradox is an argument 
where the premises are true and the reasoning appears to be correct, but the conclusions contradictory 
or mutually excluding (Olin 2003, Sainsbury 1995, Quine 1966, Ricoeur 1977). Paradox leads, just as 
with metaphor, by accepted ways of reasoning concurrently to two inconsistent, contradictory and 
mutually excluding conclusions: “this is that” and “this is not that”. Quine (1966) holds that these kinds 
of paradoxes (anomalies) are productive as they “bring on the crisis in thought.” In taking us by 
surprise paradox “... establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit 
and henceforward be avoided or revised” (p. 7). To Quine, metaphors thus help expand already existing 
ways of knowing. 
Aristotle, however, seems to argue that the paradoxical attribution of metaphors also carries the 
potential to provide genuinely new knowledge. As when he underlines the productivity of a riddle 
spoken in metaphor: “Good riddles are pleasing for the same reason; for there is learning, and they are 
spoken in metaphor, as is what Theodorus calls ta kaina legein [saying new things].” Aristotle further 
stresses that “... this occurs when there is a paradox and not, as he says, in opposition to previous 
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opinion; rather it is like the bogus word coinages in jests” (Rhetoric 1412a 33 – 38). The mystery of the 
paradoxical attribution of cosmopolitanism is thus that it articulates truly new things in an unexpected 
manner. In this way, the metaphor of cosmopolitanism may not only serve to expand earlier ways of 
knowing, but also to produce truly new forms of knowledge. But how does that happen? And what may be the 
potential pitfalls and possibilities of a mysterious riddle that seems to jeopardize the very vision of the 
social world? 
 
 
Cosmopolitanism Surprises, Bewilders and Educates 
 
The mystery of cosmopolitanism is that it compares and contrasts reality with an impossible image, 
while concurrently asserting it to be something which it is not, namely this impossible image. However, 
it is precisely this paradoxical attribution that signifies its impossible possibilities: Providing 
contradictory images of the world as concurrently “cosmopolitan” and “not cosmopolitan”, the 
emerging new cosmopolitanism appears as a riddle. Of which Aristotle says: “The very nature indeed of 
a riddle is this, to describe a fact in an impossible combination of words (which cannot be done with 
the real names for things, but can be with their metaphorical substitutes)” (Poetics 1458a, 24-29). And 
further: “Good riddles are pleasing … for there is learning” (Rhetoric 1412 a 26). But can we recognize 
the riddle of cosmopolitanism as a good riddle? In order to find out we are invited to explore the ways 
on which the mysterious riddle of cosmopolitanism surprises, bewilders, and educates. 
 
Surprise 
 
The metaphor of cosmopolitanism surprises. Immediately, it seems surprising to adopt such an alien 
name—“cosmopolitanism”—in picturing the new ways of the world. However, the surprise is not in 
the new cosmopolitanism’s alien name. The surprise is rather in the act of moving, shifting, or changing 
from one scene to another. Let me explain: To Aristotle metaphor is something happening, an act of 
naming, or of “giving the thing a name that belongs to something else” (Poetics 1457b 6, my emphasis). 
Ricoeur (1977) pictures this activity as a movement, a displacement, or a transposition of meaning 
“from ... to...” (p. 17).  But the metaphor is not labeling this activity. Rather, the metaphor is the activity 
itself. The metaphor of cosmopolitanism should thus be conceived as a verb, a process, an activity, a 
discourse, or simply something happening. This is underlined by the fact that Aristotles’ term meta-phora 
literally means “between-motion”, which in and of itself is a metaphor for a kind of change (phora) or 
‘meta-change’, namely the transposition of meaning from one location to another (Derrida 1982). The 
new “cosmopolitanism” is therefore not just a novel noun, distinction, or category. Rather, the new 
cosmopolitanism is an event, a surprising shift between scenes, a movement from one realm of language to 
another, a transposition from one outlook to another. 
This transposition happens, first, as a deviation from the current, most common and ordinary 
modes of speech. The reason is that the metaphor’s “alien name” (Poetics 1457b 31) or “name that 
belongs to something else” (1457b 7) provides a discoursive rupture by breaking away from ordinary 
language use. This is just as with the unfamiliar term “cosmopolitanism”, which differs from frequent 
terminology and thus breaks away from common academic discourse. The breaking away is underlined 
by the fact that recent cosmopolitanism is still an empty concept, not pre-given or foreclosed by the 
definition of any particular society or discourse. The metaphor of cosmopolitanism thus speaks para to 
kurion—against the current. The metaphor of cosmopolitanism also speaks para to eidthon—against the 
most common. However, here lies the power of the metaphor, because in deviating from the current, the 
most common, and ordinary modes of speech, the metaphor carries a potential to escape banality: “The 
Diction becomes distinguished and non-prosaic by the use of unfamiliar terms” (Poetics 1458a 21). 
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Next, the transposition—meta-phora or meta-change—happens through a borrowing: “Metaphor 
consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else” (1457b 9, my emphasis). To ‘metaphorize’ 
is to borrow meaning from another discoursive order, time, place, or realm and to displace it into a new 
order. Ricoeur (1977) thus holds that “it is always possible to specify metaphor’s place of origin or of 
borrowing” (p. 19). As in the case of “cosmopolitanism”, which deviates from ordinary language usage 
by adopting the alien terms kósmos (order) and polis (city) borrowed from Greek. By implication, some 
hold that the emerging new cosmopolitanism is nothing more than a borrowing from ancient Greek or 
Western modernist philosophies adapted and applied to the contemporary ways of the world. This 
borrowing may be conceived as parallel to how the Stoics borrowed Diogenes’ non-conformist idea on 
the kosmo politês and developed it into a universal ideal on a moral and political consciousness that 
crosses the barriers of national, ethnic, religious, or political affiliations (Nussbaum 1997). However, the 
work of metaphor goes beyond a break with the current practices and borrowings from tradition. The 
work of metaphors also occurs as a bewildering mixing of categories. 
 
Bewilderment 
 
The metaphor of cosmopolitanism bewilders. The bewilderment happens as the metaphor brings 
together logical opposites, namely a divine design versus the actually existing reality: 
“Cosmopolitanism” denotes an idea that all humanity belongs to the same community. But in fact, such 
a community is a utopia not yet known to exist. “Cosmopolitans” are never strangers, no matter where 
in the world they might be. But in fact, increasingly more people are now strangers no matter where in 
the world they are. Moreover, it appears a common belief that education should nurture a cosmopolitan 
ethos of genuine global solidarity. But in fact, recent studies reveal that “cosmopolitan education” 
serves as symbolic capital, a head start for the future carriers of those who are part of a global 
knowledge society. Nevertheless, despite being a utopian idea carrying ugly connotations and 
promoting somewhat distorted and disturbing practices, the notion of cosmopolitanism has been 
adopted as a symbolic representation of the new ways of the world. As a result, the metaphor 
jeopardizes the very vision of the social world by deviating from ordinary discourse and thus disturbing 
the existing logical order.  
In addition, while borrowing meaning from an external realm and displacing it into a new one, 
metaphor has power to re-describe reality (Black 1962, Ricoeur 1977, Petrie 1979). So, as the metaphor 
operates in an order already existing and in a game with rules already given, the metaphor confuses the 
very rules of the game and thus the game itself: Metaphors “make everything move and live” (Rhetoric 
1412a, 9). By implication, metaphor does not only violate the rules of the game by speaking para-
doxa—against the pre-existing doxa. Metaphor also carries the potential to transpose meanings, to re-
describe reality, and thus to create anew. While bewildering our modes of classification and changing 
our framework of understanding, the work of metaphors happens through and beyond its paradoxical 
attribution. Thus metaphor, according to Ricoeur (1977), works at the root of classification, at the very 
origin of logical thought: “The ‘metaphoric’ that transgresses the categorical order also begets it” (p. 
24). In other words, while the metaphor of cosmopolitanism brings together logical opposites it first 
surprises, then bewilders, and finally educates by uncovering a relationship hidden beneath the paradox.  
 
Education 
 
The metaphor of cosmopolitanism educates. Education occurs as the metaphor proposes an impossible 
image of the world as concurrently “cosmopolitan” and “not cosmopolitan”. The paradoxical 
attribution of the new cosmopolitanism therefore opens possibilities of learning or envisioning 
something radically new. But is it possible to learn something completely new, to make intelligible the 
acquisition of fundamentally new ways of developing knowledge, or to make comprehensible 
completely new epistemic approaches? This is the famous Meno paradox of Plato “…a man cannot 
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enquire either about that which he knows or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he 
has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is 
to enquire”. However, Petrie (1979) holds that metaphors, with their paradoxical attributions, operate 
in a way that opens possibilities of acquiring genuinely new knowledge. Realizing that metaphors “create 
similarity rather than formulate similarity already existing” (Black 1962, p. 37), Petrie maintains that 
metaphor “is one of the central ways of leaping the epistemological chasm between old knowledge and 
radically new knowledge” (p. 440). But how does this happen? 
Petrie (1979) describes the educational work of metaphor in a step-by-step process. Applied to 
the metaphor of cosmopolitanism these steps look like this: (1) First, when assuming the metaphor of 
cosmopolitanism to be a claim on the contemporary ways of the world, the learner finds it obviously 
false: All humanity does not belong to the same community; numerous people are currently homeless 
wherever in the world; and a cosmopolitan ethos does by no way mirror a genuine solidarity, but rather 
a form of symbolic capital facilitating social positioning. (2) But next, the learner may overlook the 
bewilderment, read the implicit comparison, and embrace the resemblance. If so, the metaphor will be 
at work in the transposition of meaning from one location to another; from the learner’s image of a 
divine design to her outlook of the really existing reality. The metaphor of cosmopolitanism thus helps 
to extend already existing knowledge as it deviates from current modes of thought and borrows from 
another realm of discourse. But herein lies the pitfall of the new cosmopolitanism, since the making of 
it is in danger of being generated and justified by a cosmogony motivated by an escape from chaos. 
While seeing cosmos as the ideal archetype of an orderly system, Eliade (1952) holds that such a 
 
cosmogony is the perfect pattern of whatever requires ‘doing’. This is not just because the 
Cosmos is the ideal archetype both of all creative situations and of all created things, but also 
because the Cosmos is the work of God. Hence it is made holy in its very structure. By 
extension, all that is perfect, complete, harmonious or fruitful, in short, all that is ‘cosmosized’, 
all that is like cosmos is holy. To do something well, to craft, to build, to create, construct, 
fashion, shape, form, all simply mean that something has been brought into existence, has been 
given life and, in the last resort, made to resemble that pre-eminently harmonious organism, the 
Cosmos. Therefore, the Cosmos, let it be said once more, is the pattern created by the gods, 
their masterpiece (pp. 474 – 475).  
 
Such a cosmogony is undoubtedly appealing. But the danger is that it, in its borrowing from a 
traditional myth and endeavor to escape chaos, overlooks the existing ways of the world. (3) The vital 
educational work of metaphor thus happens beyond a deviation and a borrowing, as may be the case of 
the current cosmopolitan turn. In bringing together logical opposites, the metaphor of 
cosmopolitanism violates the cognitive framework and the logical categories generating our very modes 
of learning of and from the contemporary ways of the world. Further, the interactivity of the metaphor 
bridges the gap “between earlier conceptual and representational schemes and the later scheme of the 
totally unfamiliar to be learned” (Petrie 1979, p. 442) and initiates therefore radically new forms of 
thought. In this way, the metaphor provides radically new ways of learning. In other words, the metaphor of 
cosmopolitanism does not only initiate a growth of knowledge, cosmopolitanism also comes forward as 
an invention, since the name and metaphor instigate radically new modes of learning and new ways of 
seeing the world. The paradoxical attribution of the metaphor thus opens possibilities of learning 
something radically new. As Bateson (1972) also holds: The paradoxical attribution of metaphor does 
not facilitate learning. It is rather the very condition for learning radically new things. 
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In sum, I have drawn attention to the contemporary cosmopolitanism and the ways in which it carries 
novel social images and epistemic shifts. In the first part of the article, I portrayed the new 
cosmopolitanism as a metaphor for a way of life, an ideal and an outlook. Next, I revealed how the 
name and metaphor of cosmopolitanism compares and contrasts with reality and projects an impossible 
image, while concurrently asserting it to be something that it is not, namely this impossible image. 
While assuming something that it is not, the name and metaphor carries a paradoxical attribution. The 
third part of the article explores the impossible possibilities of this paradox, which can be seen as a 
riddle that surprises, bewilders, and educates. The surprise is in the deviation from current and most 
common ways of speech. The bewilderment happens as cosmopolitanism brings together logical 
opposites, jumbles categories and disturbs existing modes of thought. Thus the educational work of 
cosmopolitanism occurs as a violation of the cognitive framework and logical categories generating our 
very modes of learning. Consequently, the vital work of the new cosmopolitanism is not in the ways in 
which it contributes to a growth of knowledge, nor in the ways in which the new cosmopolitanism 
produces truly new forms of knowledge. The vital work of the new cosmopolitanism is in the ways in 
which it may institute radically new modes of learning, and thus completely transform old ways into 
new ways of experiencing, seeing and knowing a globalised world of change.  
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